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1. Autonomy through Concept Formation: the Socratic Element 
Philosophizing, according to Ekkehard Martens, can be seen as an elemental cultural 
technology, like arithmetic or writing, which both can and should be acquired in 
childhood. Martens is proposing here an understanding of philosophy that attributes 
value not only to the content canon, but also to the process itself, as Wittgenstein, for 
one, also did when he stated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, “Philosophy is not 
a doctrine, but an activity.” For Socrates, this activity consisted in “giving an account 
of ourselves, our knowledge, our way of life.” (Plato, 2008a, 187d). In Nietzsche’s 
view, the precondition for this kind of accounting is the personal capacity for self-
distancing, which allows us to grasp our quite individual primal experiences of 
emotion, perception, sudden illuminations of insight, and so on, as general concepts 
and logical structures. 
“Let us think […] of the formation of concepts: every word at once becomes 
an idea by having not just to serve as a kind of reminder for the unique and entirely 
individualized original experience to which it owes its genesis, but also to fit 
countless more or less similar cases; strictly speaking, cases that are not the same, or 
in other words, an assortment of altogether unequal cases. Every concept arises from 
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the equation of that which is not equal.” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 879. „For Nietzsche, 
however, the non-identity of subject and object in no way means the lack of any 
mediation between them”, see Schmidt 1996). And, further: 
The human individual […] as a rational being now subjects his actions to the rule of 
abstraction […] he first generalizes all these impressions to less colorful, cooler concepts 
in order to harness them to the wagon of his life and actions. Everything that 
distinguishes humans from animals depends on this ability to diffuse visual metaphors 
into a schema, that is, to dissolve an image into a concept. (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 881) 
Philosophizing with Children addresses the need to acquire this competency by 
focusing attention on working with concepts. Barbara Brüning, however, unlike 
Matthew Lipman, does not place analytical thinking—which is acquired in public 
school instruction—in the foreground of in her practical work, but rather the 
“expansion of the conceptual repertoire.” Here she tries to work inductively or 
deductively with six-year-olds in a “cooperative process of reflection,” using 
concepts like life and death, idea and thing, or thinking and dreaming, “which go 
beyond the realm of what is concrete to the senses. We try to discover the 
characteristics summarized in these concepts and use them to develop our ability to 
imagine.” (Brüning, 1984, p. 24) 
In order for this philosophically indispensable struggle for the concept to 
succeed, Hans-Joachim Werner has suggested, one needs to see “alterity” or 
“mutuality” (Martin Buber) as opportunities for broadening knowledge; and so one 
must be attentive to the children’s interests, their world of thoughts, ideas, and 
emotions, in short, their life-world. With regard to concepts, this means making 
them accessible through illustration in various media1:   
“If you want to talk with children, say, about the basic structure of language, exemplary 
situations and processes in the mode of Jonathan Swift’s “Gulliver” or Peter Bichsel’s 
“Tisch-Geschichte” are good choices. Anyone who really gets involved on this level will 
often be amazed at the insights and questions that suddenly occur to the children, as for 
example when a boy in a course with fourth graders, during a discussion of the 
difference between the words “chaise” and “chair,” suddenly called into question this 
distinction in itself. When asked about it, he explained his doubt by suggesting that both 
expressions referred to the same mental picture and the same object—thus putting into 
words a basic problem of language that has been under discussion since the time of Plato 
and Aristotle.” (Werner, 1997, p. 17) 
Martens credits Judy Kyle with early efforts “to make children capable of forming 
their own ideas about their realities, and able to think about how ideas are formed.” 
(Martens, 1999, p. 97) Understanding the process of concept formation and creative
                                                   
1 For this reason a comprehensive repertoire of stories and other resources for preschool, school, and 
private use has been developed within the framework of Philosophy for Children. 
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cooperation in this process lead to an increase in autonomy. For one thing, 
cooperative reflection on concept formation enables children to take the knowledge 
they already have and use it to find their bearings within a culture; but it also allows 
them to infuse new life into old concept schemata through a reflective approach, 
developing new ways of seeing that introduce new concepts and thus expand their 
repertoires of thought and action. In this way the children not only expand their 
individual images of themselves and the world, but also the culture in which they 
live. For this reason Martens regards “concept formation” as one of the critically 
important pillars of philosophizing with children. In philosophical terms, this view 
is based on an understanding of referentiality in which the relationship between the 
signified and the sign is not ontologically based, but is formed in a process of 
consensus. Martens points out that Plato already discussed this linguistic-
philosophical position on the status of concepts in his dialogue Kratylos. There the 
protagonist Hermagones addresses the issue in this way: “for any name which you 
give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the 
new name is as correct as the old […] for there is no name given to anything by 
nature; all is convention and habit of the users.” (Plato, 2009a, 383a-384d) 
Martens also takes subsequent arguments into account to theoretically 
ground practices of “children’s philosophy” (these include Aristotle, John Wilson, 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Bertrand Russell, and most importantly, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: see Martens, 1999, pp. 97–124).  Since in his view the relationship 
between a concept and its designated object realm is not arbitrary, he suggests 
examining a concept’s speculatively presumed breadth of tolerance using a 
concretely logical reality test in which the children can examine the coherence of 
related objects and actions associated with the concept. As an example Martens uses 
the often-cited table, which is defined not so much by its form as by its use, namely 
as something upon which one can place an object for any length of time. Seen from 
this angle, a large round loaf of bread on which cheese is served can be a table 
(Martens, 1999, pp. 103. An additional requirement: one can sit around it.), but less 
so a high ocean wave that by necessity supports a surfer only briefly. 
Other philosophers have also emphasized that working on concepts in 
philosophizing with children is not a goal in itself, but serves to creatively expand 
self-image and worldview and also to school the kind of rational thinking that 
should support children’s independent thinking processes and life choices. As 
Daniela Camhy and Ann Sharp emphasize, “In Philosophy with Children, the point 
is not the rote learning of factual knowledge, but rather the development of active 
thought. The main purpose is to help children learn how to think for themselves. 
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The aim is also to make them aware of their own capacities to discover, explore, 
infer, and to build upon these capacities.” (Invitation 2006) 
 The most fundamental concerns of philosophers are “concepts,” “rational 
thinking,” and “reason.” “What is a concept?” “What is a judgment?” “What is the 
place of reason?” These are questions that recur throughout the history of 
philosophy. And since Friedrich Nietzsche called “usefulness for life”2 (2) the 
criterion for reason, which also includes concept formation, I would like to add his 
name at this point to the list of philosophers like Kant, Wittgenstein, Cassirer, or 
Dewey, who have been used in the past as sources for the theoretical underpinnings 
of philosophizing with children. As Martens also notes, “Knowledge […] according 
to Nietzsche’s anti-Platonic conviction, is not the inherent goal of a pure striving for 
truth, but rather an indispensable tool in the struggle for survival.” (Martens, 2000, 
p. 84) 
For the late Nietzsche, the concepts “survival” and “self-perpetuation” that 
had been popularized by Charles Darwin were only very inadequate representations 
of human capabilities, since they reduced humans to nothing more than the mere 
effort to secure continued existence. The “gear wheels of reason,” he thought, should 
instead promote “self-expansion” or an increase in possibilities, and should help the 
self-aware person achieve sovereignty (Gerhardt, 1995, p. 129). This view of a 
practical philosophy in service to life frames Nietzsche’s critique of reason, in which 
he distances himself from an inappropriate overestimation (Martens, 2000, p. 86) of 
rationality and assigns to it a constructive task.  
Using Nietzsche’s terminology, the goal is to discover how and to what 
extent reason can serve life. His epistemological point of departure presumes that 
when we assess the value of reason, we deceive ourselves in two ways: first in 
overestimating reason’s ability to penetrate to the truth, second in evaluating its 
importance in the context of our lives. In the following, we will examine both cases 
and ask how Nietzsche finds these misconceptions useful for life. For Nietzsche does 
not necessarily see self-deception or illusion as negative, since in his view the 
wisdom of reason is subordinated to a higher instance: life, or the wisdom of the 
body. “There is a ‘chemistry of ideas and feelings,’ a ‘developmental history of […] 
concepts’ that can’t be separated from the existential condition of humanity. Behind 
the individual epistemological positions, Nietzsche sees ‘consequences for 
valuation’; behind these stands the body as a formation more deserving of ‘credence’ 
                                                   
2 In Nietzsche’s early work “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life,” the second of the Untimely 
Meditations, he develops as a measure of an individually meaningful attitude toward the past, against 
any scientific objectivity, its “Lebensdienlichkeit” (service to life) in which everything is measured under 
the aspect of its usefulness in dealing with the most important existential problems. 
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than everything that is merely thought. Both the feelings and perceptions of the 
empiricists and the cogitationes of the rationalists are somatically bound […]. This 
affects the idea of ‘pure’ knowledge as a congruence of thinking and being 
unclouded by non-theoretical factors” (compare Gerhardt, 2000, and Schmidt, 1996, 
p. 128).  
2. What Reason Can Accomplish: The Epistemological Perspective 
Since the significance attributed to reason depends upon what it can accomplish, I 
will first discuss Nietzsche’s untimely assessment of what reason can do. We find his 
most pointed illustration in his fable of the “clever beasts” who invented cognition, 
but had to expire after drawing only a few breaths in nature. Nietzsche calls that 
short span of time “the most arrogant and mendacious minute in world history.” 
(Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 875). In his short essay On the Pathos of Truth, which he 
presented to Cosima Wagner for Christmas 1872, Nietzsche explicitly discusses the 
despair that comes with insight into “how miserable, how shadowy and fleeting, 
how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect seems within nature.” Here he 
describes the last moments of these “clever beasts,” as they realized, “to their great 
annoyance,” shortly before their demise, “that they had understood everything 
wrong. They died, and in dying cursed the truth. This is how these despairing beasts 
were who invented cognition.” (p. 759, On the Pathos of Truth). 
How, according to Nietzsche, did this overestimation of reason come about, 
“that arrogance connected to cognition and feelings that descended like a blinding 
fog over the eyes and senses of humans and deceived them about the value of 
existence?” (p. 876, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense). In The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche identifies the Greek philosopher Socrates, whom he places on the same 
level as Jesus and Buddha, as a key figure in this development. Socrates, by pointing 
the way to the “brightness of knowledge,” had initiated an historic transition, a new 
age that saw the “new and unprecedented esteem for knowledge and insight” as its 
special advantage (p. 89, The Birth of Tragedy). This new age found its apogee in 
Socrates’ provocation, clothed in his assertion that he alone “admitted to knowing 
nothing.” From the resulting scrutiny of all things, Socrates drew conclusions about 
the “inner falsity,” even “reprehensibility” of existence, and the need to “correct” it.  
Thus Socrates became the forerunner of a completely different culture, art, 
and morality, destroying the “beautiful world” of ancient tragedy formerly marked 
by an inner unity of “instinct and awareness,” and so inaugurating our diminished 
age. In Nietzsche’s view, then, the overestimation of reason played a decisive role in 
the demise of ancient tragedy. It led to the displacement of archaic “instinctive 
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wisdom” (today we would say intuitive wisdom) that had been given in the weaving 
together of Dionysian and Apollonian principles in the medium of art. This 
conjoining was ripped apart by the work of the “new-born daemon named Socrates” 
(p. 83). Now the new opposition was between the Dionysian and Socratic principles. 
Now only the Daimonion of Socrates embodied a rudiment of “instinctive wisdom.” 
But in its purely cautionary function, it limited itself to “confronting […] conscious 
knowledge as a hindrance.” Due to the “thoroughly abnormal nature” of Socrates, 
“instinct” as inner knowledge thus became the medium of the inner voice, the critic. 
Consciousness, by contrast, became “the creator”. As a result, inner knowledge 
stood opposed to this conscious form of reason as “rationalistic method” (p. 85: 
„Whose highest law in something like ´everything must be reasonable to be 
beatiful´”) advocated by Socrates, which was marked on the one hand by its clear 
and conceptual insight and on the other by its capacity to be rationally argued 
(Steinmann, 2000, p. 17). This new rationalistic way of thinking signified a 
“fundamental decision about the trajectory of meaning within which thinking and 
action are carried out. Socrates introduced the ‘type of the theoretical man’ 
(Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 98, The Birth of Tragedy) which has endured into the modern 
era and is characteristic of scientific thinking.” (Steinmann, 2000, p. 15) 
“Virtue is knowledge,” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 85) is the new moral formula of 
Socrates. “Sin arises only from ignorance; the virtuous person is the happy person.” 
(p. 85). However, using quotations from Laches, Martens demonstrates that Socrates 
was absolutely not engaging in “intellectualism” with his theoretical efforts, but only 
trying to prevent “blind actionism” by analyzing the concepts governing action 
(compare Martens, 1999, p. 115). Knowledge structures itself through concepts, and 
so it is only logical that Socrates begins by clarifying concepts. In Nietzsche’s view, 
however, truth as the ultimate goal of reason cannot be discovered by the human 
intellect. Nietzsche sees Socrates’ efforts at definition, intended to penetrate to 
essence or being, as nothing more than work on constructs and preliminary designs, 
and concludes that it is an error to believe that they correspond to the nature or 
essence of things.  
In his essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” Nietzsche writes: “As 
a genius of construction, man raises himself far above the bee in the following way: 
whereas the bee builds with wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the 
far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from 
himself.” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 882, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense) Humans 
construct the world in which they live. We may believe we know something about 
things, but in the end we can only speak of them metaphorically. The “thing in 
itself” cannot be grasped (p. 878). To the question, “What then is truth?” Nietzsche 
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answers: “A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short, 
a sum of human relations […] Truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that 
they are illusions.” (p. 880). For this reason Nietzsche considers declared truths 
anthropomorphic; they contain “not a single point that is true in itself, real, and 
binding” (p. 883).  
Nietzsche’s global statement that there is no truth can be interpreted as a 
warning against the metaphysical objectification of reality. We do not arrive at the 
essence of things with the help of language: “the entire medium in which and with 
which the man of truth, the researcher, the philosopher later works and constructs, 
originates, if not in cloud-cuckoo-land, then at any rate surely not in the essence of 
things.” (p. 879). 
From a metaphysical point of view, what we assert to be “true” corresponds 
to nothing (Gerhardt, 1995, p. 110). In this way Nietzsche relativizes the human 
ability to know through his disillusioning insight that with our human truth we 
cannot get beyond our own limits. Despite all our theoretical exertions we arrive at 
nothing worthy of the name “being.” Volker Gerhardt illustrates this thought with 
an image: “In the final analysis we are only pointing with the finger of truth at 
ourselves.” (p. 106) Humans thus cannot approach the truth outside themselves. “In 
other words, in the absolute sense there is no truth.” (p. 106) 
For truthseekers who know that there is no discernable truth outside 
themselves, acknowledging this insight leads to an attitude of mutual respect, since 
no one can claim to own the truth. And strictly speaking, this also implies that, in 
searching for answers to the “great” metaphysical questions, any all too one-sided 
dominance of adults over children is not valid—a conviction that is among the most 
basic tenets of the Philosophizing with Children movement (Werner, 1997, p. 18). Like 
adults, children point “with the finger of truth at themselves” and for that reason 
find answers “suited” to themselves in order to engage with one another. As a rule, 
though, people are unaware of their own construction process. According to 
Nietzsche, the intellect places itself in service to human arrogance and the pride 
humans take in their great capacity for knowledge. Reason, in other words, deceives 
us about its own capacity to deliver results.  
And yet, in another context, Nietzsche finds the mind’s strategy of deception 
completely appropriate, namely in the context of individuation and moral 
development. Thus, from forming the concept “freedom” humans derive their 
illusion that they are free. This illusion leads to moral accomplishments. People 
search for meaning; they give themselves laws and act in accordance with them, 
whereby they become self-aware individuals and take responsibility for 
themselves.Without this self-deception they would be held back on an animalistic 
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level of existence (compare Gerhardt, 1995, p. 133, and Nietzsche, KSA5, p. 293, 
Genealogy of Morals). It is for this reason, Nietzsche writes, that the intellect 
develops “its chief powers in deception […] as a means to preserve the individual.” 
(Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 876, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense). Becoming 
human, the educational process of morality—through which humanity develops 
within the species’ history and with the help of reason from crude individuality to 
self-aware personhood—progresses from utilitarian considerations through the 
principle of honor to finally reach self-awareness or self-control: 
The three stages of morality up to the present: The first sign that a beast has become 
human is that his behavior is no longer directed to his momentary comfort, but rather to 
his enduring comfort; that is, when man becomes useful, expedient: then for the first time 
the free rule of reason bursts forth. A still higher level is reached when man acts 
according to the principle of honor, by means of which he finds his place in society, 
submitting to commonly held feelings; this raises him high above the stage when he was 
guided only by personally understood expedience. Now he shows and wants to be 
shown respect; that is, he understands his advantage as dependent on what he thinks of 
others and they of him. Finally, at the highest stage of morality up until now, he acts in 
accordance with his standard for things and men; he himself determines for himself and 
others what is honorable, what is profitable. He has become the lawgiver of opinions, in 
accordance with the ever more refined concept of usefulness and honor. Knowledge 
enables him to prefer what is most useful, that is, to prefer general usefulness to personal 
usefulness, and the respectful recognition of common, enduring worth to prestige of the 
moment. He lives and acts as a collective individual. (Nietzsche, KSA2, 94, p. 91, Human, 
All Too Human)  
This process of becoming human is not possible without the formation of concepts. 
But so that we can come to an agreement about our concepts, reason, aside from its 
fundamental role in deceiving the self, must also function to make a common 
construction process possible. For this reason, although Nietzsche regards the truths 
central to correspondence and coherence theories of truth as “indifferent truths” 
(Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 287, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life) consensus 
theory could to some extent be an exception. In his view, the intellect also makes 
itself useful in the “peace process” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 877, On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense) between the self and others. In this, the first step is the 
development of a common language. In consensus, binding concepts are laid down 
for what will count as truth: 
For now that which from this point on will count as “truth” becomes fixed; that is, a way 
of designating things is invented that has the same validity and force everywhere, and 
the legislation of language also produces the first laws of truth; for the contradiction 
between truth and lies comes into being here for the first time: the liar uses the valid 
tokens of signification to make the unreal appear real. (p. 877) 
To be truthful […] means to use the customary metaphors. (p. 881) 
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Since the relationship between concepts and objects is tied to human, personal 
attributions of meaning, concepts are not only used for promoting autonomy to 
serve life. Concepts, especially moral ones, can also be reinterpreted with intentions 
hostile to life; they can be provided with new contexts and connotations, and so on, 
thus hindering autonomous development by means of subtle manipulations. Thus 
Nietzsche points especially to the revaluation of originally “thing-oriented” concepts 
and the associated displacement of power, which can pave the way through its 
suggestive effects for the imposition of an external will. Nietzsche develops this idea 
in his late work Genealogy of Morals: “All the ideas of ancient humanity must initially 
be understood, to a degree we can hardly imagine, as coarse, crude, superficial, 
narrow, blunt, and in particular, non-symbolic. The ‘pure man’ is from the start 
simply a man who washes himself, who denies himself certain foods that cause skin 
diseases, […] not much more!” (Nietzsche, KSA5, p. 264) 
The revaluation of concepts, according to Nietzsche, was carried out by the 
ascetic priests. Unlike the warriors and ordinary people, they dedicated themselves 
to a way of life turned away from action that undermined their health. As a result, 
they invented the ascetic ideal as a remedy against their disease. Here Nietzsche 
includes “the whole metaphysic of the priests—so hostile to the senses, making men 
so indolent and sophisticated.” The aristocracy’s way of life, in which individuals 
actively expressed themselves in action, and which declared as its own ideal life-
affirming behavior in the sense of an ethics of striving for virtue (άρετή), (Greek 
epics and archaic elegies represent an ethic of heroism “whose chief characteristics 
are practical intelligence and valor, avoiding shame and striving for renown”; 
Renaud, 2002) was now considered egotistical and bad. The aristocratic value 
equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = fortunate = loved by god) was 
reversed. Now it was the miserable ones, without even the strength to live out their 
needs, who were good and thus loved by god. 
The ascetic priests, then, exercised their rule by inverting the values that 
affirmed life and by defining all moral concepts anew. Nietzsche describes this 
process as the reversal of the cave metaphor. In his narrative, he goes down into the 
cave himself and hears how all concepts are being reshaped in whispers: “weakness” 
is mendaciously falsified as “merit”; anxious baseness as “humility”; submission to 
those one hates as “obedience” (Nietzsche, KSA5, p. 281). As a result of this 
revaluation of concepts, vital natures adjust themselves to values hostile to life in 
order to classify themselves as “beings who behave morally.” 
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Only reflection on the concepts and their associated metaphors has the potential to 
disrupt their manipulative power3. This is why the act of concept formation 
determines the methodological trajectory of Philosophizing with Children and is 
characterized by Martens as “liberation from the ‘violence’ of fixed ideas, and as 
mental work.” (Martens, 1999, p. 106; here Martens also refers to Nietzsche’s 
description of “seigneurial rights,” the custom of the ruling class to name entities 
and thereby take possession of them.) We see here that elementary school children—
contrary to popular belief—can provide original meaningful content for the ethical-
political concept “social justice,” as Markus Tiedemann has demonstrated 
(Tiedemann, 2006). Further examples of reflection on ethical concepts can be found 
in the work of Gareth Matthews, who animates children in very different culures to 
think about what they understand as “the highest happiness” (Matthew, 2007) or in 
the work of Takara Dobashi (Dobashi 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) who gives us insight 
into the thoughts of Japanese children about what it means to be human, or of Eva 
Zoller Morf (2006) who philosophizes with Swiss children about the concept of rage, 
or Eva Steinherr (2006) who presents the reflections of German children on “evil,” or 
Barbara Brüning (1984), who thinks with six-year-olds about whether it is 
permissible to kill animals. I myself discuss the meaning of winning and losing in 
games with fourth graders (Marsal & Wilke, 2005) and the concept “friendship” with 
preschool children (Marsal & Dobashi, 2004). For “ethical inquiry,” Lipman even 
developed an entire manual: the course book Lisa.  
This list of reflections by and with children on moral concepts and their 
interrelationships could be expanded at will. The value of these reflections has been 
discussed in various contexts. Aside from “service to life” and the therapeutic effect 
                                                   
3 For this reason Nietzsche, like every other philosopher, participates in the formation and analysis of 
concepts, for example in his efforts to clarify the concepts “nihilism,” “meaning of history,” “life,” and 
so on. In the framework of his experimental philosophy, he even risks another foray into metaphysics 
with his work on the concept “will to power;” for he needs to find a foundation for his life-practical 
expectations, which he links to the concepts “innocence of becoming,” “immoralism,” “revaluation of 
values,” and “virtue of the free spirit.” His understanding of metaphysics, of course, does not 
correspond to the one held by his contemporaries, which he condemns in Twilight of the Gods as 
theological and ontological metaphysics. Nietzsche characterizes his time as one which (under the 
ascetic ideal of world duplication) substitutes general objects for its general concepts such as existence, 
substance, reality, and so on, as if reality actually existed in the sense of objects. Nietzsche’s own search 
for metaphysical proofs, in his attempt to metaphysically underpin his philosophy, to arrive at the 
origin, to discover the primal power motivating every life, is demonstrated by Karl Jaspers in his 
analysis of Nietzsche’s attitude toward Christ, Christianity, and the church, and by Martin Heidegger, 
who calls Nietzsche the consummator of metaphysics, or—most recently—by Volker Gerhardt in his 
1996 monograph (On the Will to Power), There he interprets Nietzsche’s understanding of metaphysics 
with the aid of Kant, who understood metaphysics as an attempt to critically assess the conditions and 
limits of human understanding. 
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emphasized by Daniela Camhy, described above, the habituation to habits of 
reflective competence should be mentioned, which is useful throughout life and into 
advanced age. Despite all limits to theoretical cognition, then, reason has a practical 
meaning for life, as Nietzsche also wished to demonstrate with his critique of reason. 
Thus, in the final analysis, Nietzsche carries on the enlightening, aporetic tradition of 
Socrates and Kant. In contrast to the decades-long reception history that classified 
Nietsche as an “irrationalist”—for example in Georg Lukacs’ work Die Zerstörung der 
Vernunft (Destruction of Reason) (Lukacs, 1962) —Nietzsche regarded himself as an 
enlightener, especially in the years from1876 to 1882, when he considered himself a 
freethinker (Ottmann, 1985, p. 10). In Human, All Too Human (Nietzsche, KSA2, p. 47) 
he maintains that he will never allow the banner of the Enlightenment out of his 
hand. 
3. The Value of Reason in the Life Process: The Ethical Perspective 
Within the framework of whatever we agree upon as “truth,” what most engages 
Nietzsche’s interest is the practical significance that this “ascertained” truth has for 
the individual in his own life’s context. So Nietzsche asks: “How much truth can a 
spirit endure, how much truth can it dare?—for me that became the real measure of 
value.” (Nietzsche, KSA13, 1988, p. 492, Unpublished Works, 16/32) For Nietzsche, 
truth’s value or lack of value is related to the choice of appropriate life goals. This 
choice is appropriate when it leads to exceeding the limits of the self or, as 
formulated by Annemarie Pieper, in “self-transcendance from man to superman.” 
(Pieper, 2000). In his experimental philosophy, Nietzsche proposes a truth theory 
that draws on the relationship to the self, which I therefore call an “ethical truth 
theory.” The late Nietzsche invests all his pathos in the idea that humans first 
develop their best powers with the truth, and in their belief in truth exceed 
themselves. In other words, truth allows for the individual’s self-expansion; 
“through it he finds an authoritative ideal in which he objectifies himself. Yet as 
much as he goes beyond his randomness and inadequacy in it, he must not forget its 
origin and its purpose. Truth remains a self-imposed measure of the man; it has its 
value only for him.” (Gerhardt, 1995, p. 111). 
Nietzsche attributes to the Pre-Socratics, such as Heraclitus, for example, that 
they similarly proposed an “ethical-psychological-anthropological” truth theory. “To 
them man was the truth and the crux of the matter, all else only appearance and 
deceptive play.” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 815, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks). But if man is “truth,” then it is expressed in whatever he makes of himself. 
Thus truth’s authoritative value is not in the relationship between concepts and 
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objects, because knowledge that orients itself toward the ideal of objectivity does not 
set its own goals and thus remains in the service of alien value judgments. The value 
of truth resides in the concepts that create a self-conferring meaning: that is, in the 
relationship between the concepts and the I: “Science with its truth is only a means, 
and not already an end in itself. Nietzsche is interested in what determines  ends, 
thus creating values and giving meaning to man.” (Gerhardt, 1995, p. 113). Since in 
Nietzsche’s view life can only fulfill a meaning when it does not separate itself from 
the senses, the “meaning that guides our doing is nothing other than the conceptual 
framing of a goal imagined by the senses.” (p. 71). With this we have definitively 
arrived at the second perspective from which reason should be viewed. Important 
here is the significance one gives to reason within one’s personal inner spectrum, or 
within the self-perception of one’s own life manifestations and their regulation. 
From this perspective, Nietzsche characterizes reason as discussed up to now in the 
following way: “An instrument of your body is also your little reason, my brother, 
which you call “spirit”—a little instrument and toy of your great reason.” 
(Nietzsche, KSA4, p. 39, Thus Spoke Zarathustra) 
In Nietzsche’s “book for everyone and no one,” the ancient Persian sage 
Zarathustra speaks this enigmatic and provocative sentence in his oration against 
the “despisers of the body.”  
The “little reason” is equated with “spirit” or the “consciousness” that makes 
humans capable of saying “I”; the “great reason” is equated with the self that stands 
behind thoughts and feelings and is identified as the reason of the body. In 
opposition to the spirit of the times, Nietzsche reverses the value relationship 
between body and mind. He defines the supposedly great reason of rational 
awareness as “a little instrument and toy of the great reason” of the body, of the 
animated corpus. With this Nietzsche calls for a radical reorientation of attitudes 
toward the body. No longer should the body be the servant of the soul, as the 
idealistic tradition would have it, but instead should represent “the principle of 
productivity and creation.” Nietzsche subordinates the spirit, or consciousness, to 
the body; and with this, as little reason, it steps back behind the great reason of the 
body.” (Gerhardt, 2000, p. 123) He thus does not share the premise of Kant’s critical 
philosophy, according to which reason in its recourse to human powers is 
considered a stable principle. Nietzsche doubts that the strength or even the 
greatness of mankind derives from reason. Instead he believes that we humans 
greatly overestimate our conceptual and logical competence. For him it is all too 
obvious that reason compensates only very poorly for physical and psychic 
deficiencies. “The mind is not anything on which life is really based. The greatest 
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part of our lives is lived without the participation of our reason.” (Gerhardt, 1995, p. 
109). And so Nietzsche asks, 
What does man actually know about himself? […] Does nature not conceal most things 
from him—even concerning his own body—in order to confine and lock him within a 
proud, deceptive consciousness […]? She threw away the key. And woe to that fatal 
curiosity which might one day have the power to peer out and down through a crack in 
the chamber of consciousness and then suspect that man is sustained in the indifference 
of his ignorance by that which is pitiless, greedy, insatiable, and murderous—as if 
hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger. Given this situation, where in the world could 
the drive for truth have come from? (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 877, On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense) 
According to Nietzsche’s basic premise, this “drive for truth” can only have a 
function in service of life, and in this case that means finding the “courage of one’s 
own truth,” which is not directed against the body, but integrates it. It means finding 
one’s own goals and daring to go beyond one’s own boundaries—in other words, 
transcending one’s own “person,” which in Nietzsche’s definition consists of the 
small but highly meaningful reason of the spirit and the big reason of the animated 
body. This is something that the “young soul” can already accomplish: 
Man […] need only cease to go easy on himself; let him follow his conscience, which cries 
out to him ‘Be yourself! You are none of those things that you now do, think, and desire.’ 
Every young soul hears this call night and day and trembles, for when it thinks of its true 
liberation, it has an inkling of the measure of happiness for which it is destined from 
eternity. As long as it is shackled by the chains of opinion and fear, nothing can help it 
attain this happiness. And how bleak and senseless this life can become without this 
liberation! […] We are accountable to ourselves for our own existence; as a consequence, 
we also want to be the true helmsmen of our existence and keep it from resembling a 
mindless coincidence. […] ‘I want to try to attain freedom,’ the young soul says to itself. 
[…] But how can we find ourselves again? How can humans know themselves? […] And 
that is the secret of all cultivation: it does not provide artificial limbs, noses of wax, or 
corrective lenses. […] Instead, education is liberation, removal of all weeds, rubble, and 
vermin that seek to harm the plant’s delicate shoots, a radiance of light and warmth […]. 
(Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 338. Schopenhauer as Educator) 
Nietzsche describes this act of self-liberation and self-transcendance in Zarathustra’s 
first discourse, “Of the Three Transformations.” (Nietzsche, KSA4, p. 29, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra). Here the spirit throws off its chains of convention “in a great 
disengagement” and frees itself “in an overwhelming will to itself.” This spirit, now 
free, develops in a series of painful and lonely processes into a mature spirit of self-
mastery and discipline of the heart. Along the way it develops its own laws, 
independently derived from general human virtues like love, bravery, and justice, 
and obeys them as self-imposed laws. The fundamental attitude of the free spirit is 
an experimental one (Kaufmann, 1988, p. 252), its privilege of mastery is “to live 
provisionally,” “to be permitted to offer itself up to adventure.” (Nietzsche, KSA2, p. 
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18, Human, All Too Human). The prerequisite for considering such an opportunity for 
development despite of the dangers of failure is Nietzsche’s trust in the successful 
process of integration into nature. Nietzsche calls the positive sensation of one’s own 
vitality, in which humans shake off the sickness of nihilism and pessimism, “great 
health.” This alone leads to freeing productive powers with which individuals  make 
themselves into persons and create corresponding forms of life: “But why you are 
there, individual, I ask you. And if none can say it for you, then try just once to 
justify the meaning of your existence, as it were, a posteriori by establishing for 
yourself a purpose, a final goal, a “for this reason,” a high and noble “for this.” 
(Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 319, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life) 
To summarize, we can say that Nietzsche’s predominant thought in the 
eighties is that the free spririt, though of necessity intellectual, can only become alive 
and aesthetic in alliance with its sensuality. Only in sensuality, in the “sense of the 
earth,” does all creation have a cosmic, geological, and biological function. For 
Nietzsche, the great reason of the body must always accompany the little reason of 
the ratio. We can only unlock our intellect in a really productive way if we find our 
way back to our physical being, through which we can grasp ourselves as elements 
of life. One can thus see Nietzsche as an enlightener who enlightened about the 
Enlightenment. Or to say it another way, it was his intention to expand the radius of 
reason through insight into its historical, spiritual and physical conditions, thereby 
putting it in service to life. Jaspers states it more precisely: “And so the path to 
reality—thinking with the ‘entire body and life’—is at the same time the path to 
becoming completely human.” (Jaspers, 1936, p. 339) 
Children, of course, are not able develop their own laws in “solitude” and 
“self-discipline”—they are even more dependent on other people and their 
acceptance than adults. But philosophizing with others who approach them and 
their thoughts attentively and with respect provides them with a protective 
framework, with the underlying thought of making it possible for them to develop 
their own values independently, not allowing them be dictated, unexamined, by 
whatever conventions happen to be dominant in any particular time or place. 
Likewise, in Zarathustra’s discourse “Of the Three Transformations,” the trajectory 
followed toward the “playing” child (a metaphor for the highest transformation of 
the spirit) who “in world-shaping power” “playfully moves stones back and forth, 
and builds up sand piles and again demolishes them” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 153, The 
Birth of Tragedy) metaphorically practicing an eternal “construction and destruction 
of the individual world,” points toward the freely philosophizing child who, as 
described by Takara Dobashi, (see Dobashi & Marsal, 2005) is engaged in the 
“primal game.” 
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In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche emphasizes that this 
play is no arbitrary activity; here too he borrows metaphors from Heraclitus’s 
Philosophy of Becoming: “Children throw away their toys; but soon they begin again 
in an innocent frame of mind. But as soon as children build, they connect, join, and 
form according to laws and an innate sense of order. Just […] as  the struggle of 
plurality can still bear within itself law and justice.” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 831, 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks) According to Plato, whose work the 
philologist Nietzsche knew well, this metaphor was related to the play with 
concepts, (Plato, 2009b, 6, 487c) and can thus be appropriated for the practice of 
philosophizing with children.  Even though this means that the “little reason” is at 
the center of philosophizing with children, the great reason of the body is by no 
means completely suppressed, as recent experiments have shown. Thus Barbara 
Weber and Katharina Zeitler (Zeitler & Weber, 2006, pp. 89 – 94) have described 
integration of the physical in their report on the project initiative Children 
Philosophize at the University of Regensburg and Munich during the Federal Garden 
Show in 2005. They used art experienced with the senses in their “holistic 
philosophy spectacle” as the link between philosophy and the children’s life world. 
In a similar way they introduced games involving the senses as a stimulus for 
philosophizing (Marsal & Dobashi, 2006, pp. 46 – 61). 
4. The Process Dynamics of Philosophizing with Children: The Dionysian 
Element 
In contrast to the Platonists, Peripatetics, and Epicureans, for whom philosophizing 
was the highest pleasure, most adults respond more as Menon did, who said during 
a dialogue with Socrates that he felt more and more like a “crampfish,” “paralyzed 
in body and soul,” and “knew nothing more to answer.” (Plato, 2008b, 80s) But 
anyone who has had an opportunity to philosophize with children has felt that the 
“breaking apart” or “negation” of the “old,” “constrained” world contains an 
element of pleasure for them. Takeji Hayashi saw that the faces of philosophizing 
children became “beautiful.” (Dobashi, 2008) Ekkehard Martens (2006) comes to 
the conclusion that “children can philosophize and they most certainly find 
pleasure in it.” 
This pleasure, Martens asserts, derives from a sequence of four possible 
sources: (1) “Schadenfreude, or pleasure derived from unsettling others with 
hairsplitting, confusing questions in order to come out on top;” (2) “joy in arguing 
and analyzing, in their sporting enthusiasm for competitive mental games and 
challenges to their own powers,” that is, from the “joy in intellectual competition;” 
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(3) “the free movement of the mind”; “the great enthusiasm shown by children 
trying their first steps, running around and jumping with the joy of their newly 
discovered freedom. In philosophizing, the children can say whatever they think, 
pursue ideas together, try out new ways of looking at things without prejudice, 
anxiety, or embarrassment, and they can spin out the threads of their thoughts. 
While philosophizing, the only authority they are subjected to is their own insight. 
No one controls them or instructs them which direction they must take. And so their 
pleasure in philosophizing is the experience of themselves as persons who can 
evolve in freedom;” (4) the recognition and living out of truth. That is to say, while 
philosophizing the children experience their unbounded curiosity and imagination 
not only 
as freedom from […] as freedom from mere false starts, confusing opinions, and 
presumptions constraining thought. Instead, one makes philosophizing primarily the 
experience of ‘freedom to’: namely freedom to use reason in orienting oneself according 
to whatever one determines to be true or real. […] Not only did they want to express 
their ideas and opinions without being talked down to, but they also were chiefly 
interested in knowing whether their opinions were tenable or true. (Martens, 2006, p. 19–
22) 
Martens continues: 
In philosophizing we experience ourselves as reasonable beings in our capacity to be 
astonished and observe situations and objects more precisely, understanding things as 
what they are from various viewpoints, clarifying concepts, arguing with others about 
tenable and less tenable reasons, and coming up with new, seemingly fantastic ways of 
seeing things—here again the methods or (literally, from the Greek) the road markers of 
philosophizing. Philosophizing is thinking further with a method—represented on the 
ceiling fresco as the path between earth and Heaven. (p. 22–23) 
Although the aim is individual, self-aware will, the process of philosophizing with 
children is no Apollonian act in which the individual creates his or her own world in 
absolute self-reference, but rather a dialogical Socratic act. (However, the isolated 
will of the individual first becomes a factor, according to Nietzsche, in the Doric 
observation of art and the world. Apollo himself appears as “deification of the 
principium individuationes” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 28). Only Apollo’s counterpart 
Dionysus can bring freedom from self-knowledge revolving around itself and the 
prison of individuation born from dreams and illusions. Dionysus, the god of 
intoxication, allows the ego a direct connection to everything in pleasurable self-
abandonment. And since philosophizing with children is characterized by the 
philosophical activity of giving an account within the “community of inquiry” as a 
reciprocal maieutic act, (Werner, 1997, p. 18) the Socratic and the Dionysian confront 
each other there. The Dionysian shows itself in the pleasurable sense of 
accomplishment the children achieve through their own thinking and their 
“How Much Truth Can a Spirit Dare?” Nietzsche’s “Ethical” Truth Theory… | 39 
 
connection to the group: “Under the spell of the Dionysian the bond between man 
and man locks itself into place.” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 29, The Birth of Tragedy) 
The range of the ethical concepts, the “courage of one’s own truth,” then, is 
not limited to the self. “The playful construction and destruction of the individual 
world as an emanation of primal desire” now means not only the self-reflexive 
alteration and development of personal objectives, but also the crossing of borders 
from the individual world toward the world of humanity, or in other words, toward 
the “collective individual” (Nietzsche, KSA2, 94, p. 91, Human, All Too Human) 
who “gives precedence” to the common good before the personal. With this, the 
universalization of ethical concepts becomes possible: 
Thus we can find our way back to ourselves and our part in a general, universal truth 
shared by all, though only in small, elementary steps with no guarantees of safety. Then 
universal values such as human rights are not just arbitrary postulates, but are based on 
laboriously achieved insights into what is good for us all and for our lives together. 
(Martens, 2006. Pp. 22 – 23). 
Through the reflection on contents and the Dionysian process induced in the 
community of inquiry through the method of thinking moves, the Socratic and 
Dionysian do not separate, but merge with each other. Thus the content element 
connected with giving account in the Socratic sense gives rise to Dionysian pleasure, 
which according to Nietzsche is tied to nature, music, and art, as well as to the forces 
that disrupt the rigid, hard boundaries of the ego: “The striving for the infinite, the 
wing-beat of longing that accompanies the highest delight in clearly perceived 
reality, reminds us that in both states we must recognize a Dionysian phenomenon: 
again and again it reveals to us the playful construction and destruction of the 
individual world as the overflow of a primordial delight.” (Nietzsche, KSA1, p. 153, 
The Birth of Tragedy) 
Through the Dionysian we experience ourselves not just as distinct beings, 
but also as bound up in something like a deep “intoxication” with our fellow 
humans and the natural world: „Alienated, hostile, or subjugated nature, too, 
celebrates her reconciliation with her lost son, man.” (p. 29). “Now the slave is a free 
man, now all the stiff, hostile barriers break apart, those things which necessity and 
arbitrary power or “impudent fashion” have established between men. Now, with 
the gospel of world harmony, every man not only feels himself united with his 
neighbor, reconciled and fused together […]. Singing and dancing, man expresses 
himself as a member of a higher unity.” (p. 29) 
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5. Conclusion 
The objectives and methods of philosophizing with children support the idea that 
the reduction of our age so deplored  by Nietzsche, which arose from destruction of 
the inner unity of “instinct and consciousness” that had still been connected in 
ancient tragedy — or in modern terms, “intuition and consciousness”— can again be 
suspended by, among other things, philosophizing with children. Thus for Lipman 
the goal is “wisdom”: critical and creative-intuitive thinking tied to primary 
experiences and achieved in “self-determined dialogue” within the framework of a 
“community of inquiry.” (Lipman, 1984, p. 7) In this way the individual can 
transcend the self in two directions: first in further development with regard to the 
ego and the self, and second in further development with regard to the “you” and 
the “we.” In philosophizing with children, Nietzsche’s metaphorics, with his 
antithetical Socratic-Dionysian pair, provide a language game for representing the 
interweaving of ethical perspectives on the connections between self, community, 
and world, grasped and modulated by concepts. The approach to concepts is 
marked by a given epistemological approach; for Nietzsche it is marked by the 
striving to put forward a philosophical theory dedicated to personal expansion and 
development. And so his definitive question is: “How much truth does a spirit 
dare?” From the perspective of this question we can also reconstruct philosophizing 
with children, through which children and future adults can develop into 
“sovereign” persons. 
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Abstract. Philosophizing, according to E. Martens, can be seen as an elemental cultural 
technology, like arithmetic or writing, which both can and should be acquired in childhood. 
Martens is proposing here an understanding of philosophy that attributes value not only to 
the content canon, but also to the process itself, as Wittgenstein, for one, also did when he 
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For Socrates, this activity consisted in “giving an account of ourselves, our knowledge, our 
way of life.” In Nietzsche’s view, the precondition for this kind of accounting is the personal 
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of emotion, perception, sudden illuminations of insight, and so on, as general concepts and 
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